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In this paper a dynamic model is constructed in which labor and capital taxes are
determined endogenously through majority voting. The wealth distribution of the
economy is shown to influence the voting behavior, and hence the equilibrium levels
of the tax rates, which in turn affect the future distribution of wealth. It is shown
that the economy exhibits a unique dynamic behavior. Because the tax rates are
endogenously determined, asset prices, wealth distribution, and the tax rates can
display persistent fluctuations or cycles, in reaction to exogenous disturbances, or
even due to initial conditions. "Tax smoothing" does not necessarily appear to
naturally arise in such an environment. The features in the model thatcan produce
these fluctuations are studied in detail.INTRODUCTION
In this papera dynamic equilibrium model is constructed inwhich agents vote
each period on the desired capital and labor taxes that are to be implemented in
order to finance a given level ofgovernment consumption. Based on their different
wealth levels and planning horizons, agents will have distinctive preferences
concerning these tax rates. An interesting dynamic behavior arises incross sectional
wealth levels, as well as in the time-series paths of asset prices and tax rates. Itis
shown that temporary exogenous disturbances can have not only persistent effects,
but also a permanent impact on a variety of endogenous variables. Exogenous
disturbances, as well as initial conditions are shown to produce cycles in the wealth
distribution, asset prices, as well as in the endogenously determined tax rates. This
is important because there is a paucity of models, with endogenous policy
formulation, in which policies implemented in one period influence the economy in
such a manner as to alter the future course of policy formulation as well.
There has been a tremendous literature written on both the normative and
positive aspects of taxation. The normative aspects usually relate to how tax policy
can be formulated so as to maximize some sort of welfare criterion, or minimizing
the tax burden of agents, or possibly maximizing growth. For example, one might
ask the question as to what are the appropriate distortional tax rates that should be
implemented in order to retire a given amount of government debt. Or,
alternatively one might ask whether a capital-gains tax would have a deleterious
effect on the growth rate of the economy. The positive analyses of the literature
might examine the impact of actual taxes on welfare, or various endogenous
variables. A case in point would be whether the actual levels of capital and labor
taxation exacerbate, rather then ameliorate, the cyclical fluctuations of aggregates
over the course of the business cycle.
1
Until very recently, however, what had been missing from most of these
analyses of tax policy is a theory of how taxes are actually determined. Presumably
in most market economies the policy-makers make decisions based on what they
perceive to be the collective desires of a diverse group of agents in the economy.
1Government policies may then influence the distribution of wealth across the
economy. This distribution then influences the manner in which future policy
variables are determined, which in turn affects the levels of future policy variables
through the policy-making mechanism. Such mechanisms are usually absent from
traditional analyses of the affect ofgovernment policy. Itis the thesis of this paper
that it is important to understand how the wealth dynamics generated by an
economy help to influence the rules determining public policy parameters, rather
than vice versa. Furthermore, this inquiry is also conducted within the context of
a simple dynamic general equilibrium framework. This is important because there
have been comparatively few papers that have incorporated endogenous optimal
voting decisions into dynamic equilibrium models with utility-maximizing agents,
presumably because of the complicated nature of the problem.
There has been a great deal ofwork done recently in which some government
policies are determined endogenously. Tabellini (1991) studies the behavior of
government debt in an economy in which policies are determined by majority rule.
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) study an economy in which agents vote on the
composition of government spending. They then characterize the factors that
influence the size of the budget deficit. Tabellini and Persson (1990) provide a
comprehensive guide to how credibility and political issues can influence the
determination ofmacroeconomic policy. Alesina (1988) and Perotti (1992) provide
a detailed set ofreferences to this growing theoretical as well as applied literature.
What is missing from much ofthe existing literature, and what is the main point of
the present paper, is an explanation of how policies implemented in one period
transform the distribution of wealth in such a manner as to also influence the
policies that are chosen in future periods.2
There have been some recent attempts to address the issue of how
government policies might be determined endogenously in an explicitly dynamic
environment, as is done here. In some of this work, such as Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), Bertola (1993), Cooley and Soares (1994), voting is permitted only in the
initial period on the policies that are going to be implemented in the future.
2Perhaps the workmostclosely related to the present approach is thatofKrusell, and
Rios-Rull (1993a), and Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1994). In these models
the relative wealth ofthe median voter can potentially change, and themedian voter
can determine the equilibrium policies in each period. These papers employ a
population consisting of infinitely-lived agents, and the median voter is always the
same agent. However, the model described below is one of overlapping
generations, and consequently is one of the few such frameworks in which the
medianvotermust change each period. Therefore agents must determine how their
decisions will influence the future decisions of future generations.
There is a further empirical motivation for utilizing the approach to the
determination ofpolicy parameters studied in this paper. One might be very hard-
pressed to derive an argument for the optimality ofthecurrent observed government
tax and spending structures based on the solution to some optimal welfare problem,
so the reason for such a policy structure may well lie with the political nature in
which policy parameters are formulated. One might suggest thatitis no coincidence
thatin theU.s. there has recently been a growing interest in cutting capital taxation,
not to mention running higher government budget deficits, and spending more
money on social programs for the elderly, at the same time that there is a growing
population of elderly citizens. Obviously, these people have a strong incentive to
participate in the political process in such a way as to encourage policy-makers to
divert more resources in their own direction, and possibly also cut tax rates on their
main sources of income. For the elderly, this is more likely to be capital income.
Although this particular issue is not addressed in this paper, this observation serves
as a motivation for studying ormodelling how the economic agents can influence the
policy-making mechanism.
A closely related motivation is that in observed economies, the median voter
might appear to change from election to election. More recently in the U.S. the
median voter is usually older than he or she was in the previous election cycle due
to the aging ofthe baby-boom generation. Yet in much of this economic literature
there is no such dynamic "hand-oft" from one median voter to another in successive
3elections. This has serious repercussions for how policy-makers choose to handle
questions related to Medicare and Social Security. Therefore, an important
ingredient may be missing from these models. Yet there is usually a difficulty
encountered in analyzing this particular issue. It is generally an onerous task to
investigate how policies chosen by a median voter in one period will influence the
behavior of other median voters in some future period. The present paper is an
attempt to study this issue, as well as the analytical and computational challenges
that it presents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
physical and political structure, as well as the nature of the equilibrium ofthis very
simple economy is described in detail. The economy is populated by a sequence of
.overlapping generations, each ofwhich lives for three periods only. Agents work in
their first two periods oflife, and hold capital into the last two periods oflife. Each
period the government must finance a fixed level of real consumption for itself.
Each period agents vote on the appropriate levels of capital and labor taxation,
while playing a Nash game against future generations. It is assumed that the
majority of the voters determine the levels of these parameters. In Section III a
series of examples are presented. It is shown how temporary exogenous
disturbances can have persistent and permanent effects on the equilibrium, and on
the endogenous policy variables. It is shown that there can exist multiple steady-
state equilibria, which depend on the initial conditions of the economy. The
implications for the wealth distribution, and asset prices are studied. Also, it is
shown that the tax rates can appear to fluctuate dramatically in the model, with the
agents voting to use the labor tax, or the capital tax, but apparently never both
simultaneously. This provides some motivation for why one might expect to observe
the antithesis ofthe usual tax smoothing behavior. Section IV contains some final
remarks.
4THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE EQUILIBRIUM
The economy is one in which time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2,...
Each period there is a generation ofagents who enter the economy, and are present
there for three periods. The size of each generation is normalized to unity. An
agent who enters the economy in period t will be said to be a member ofgeneration
t, and is present in the economy in periods t, t+1, and t+2. Agents have perfect
foresight concerning the future. Each member of generation t wishes to consume
some of the single consumption good in period t+1, and t+2. That is to say, they
do notconsume in the first period oflife. Such agents have one unit oflabor effort
to supply inelastically in period t and in t+1, and which will produce w1•t and W2,'+l
units of the consumption good in periods t and t+1 respectively. These wages are
.measured in units of the consumption good.
There is productive capitalin the economywhich produces a dividend in units
ofthe consumption good each period. The capital stock may be thought of as land
since it does not depreciate, and cannot be augmented. Agents who are members
of generation t will wish to consume in future periods, and can do so by purchasing
productive capital in period t at a price P,. For each unit of capital held by the
agent, they then receive a dividend of d, units of the consumption good in period
t+1, and can then sell some of their capital or buy more capital in period t+1 at a
price PH1•
A member of generation t has a utility function that will be described as
follows
(1)
where c., represents consumption by an agent in period t who is currently in period
s of his life (s = 2, 3), and f3 > 0 is the discount factor. In period t each member
of generation t supplies their labor inelastically. The agent has his labor income
taxed at a rate TI,. The agent will then purchase capital with the remaining income,
so that the period t budget constraint for such an agent is then
5(2)
Here x.,.+1 represents the number of units of capital purchased in period t by an
agent, who is currently in period (s-l) ofhis life, andwhich is then taken into period
H1.
A member of generation t who enters period t+1 with X2,Hl units of capital
then collects a dividend, in units ofthe consumption good, in the amount ofdH1per
unit ofcapital. Furthermore capital can then be purchased or sold ata price ofPHl'
However, the total return to holding capital - dividend and price ofcapital - is taxed
at a rate of ~'+1.3 The agent also supplies his unit of labor, and collects wage
income of w2,'+1 and pays taxes on this income. The agent will then wish to take
. some capital into the final period of his lifetime, and the amount of this capital will
be denoted by X 3 ,,+2' The budget constraint for such an agent in the second period
of his planning horizon is then written as follows
In the final period ofthis agent's life he brings ~.'+2 units ofcapital into the period,
The agent then collects the dividend (d,+2) on the capita~ and sells his stock of
capital at a price P'+2' The agent must pay the capital tax at a rate ~H2on the total
return to capital, and consumes the remaining proceeds, The budget constraint for
the agent in this period can then be written as
(4)
It will be assumed that the available amount of capital is fixed, This amount is
normalized to be equal unity. Then the market clearing condition for the capital
market in every period t will then be written as
(5)
Each period there is a certain amount ofreal government consumption g, that must
be financed through taxing labor and/or capital income, This government
6expenditure provides no utility to agents.
TopreselVe thesimplicity ofthe environment, itwill also be assumed that the
exogenous sequence {wt." W2.I' d" g,} ~=t is strictly positive and is known with
certainty \;f t.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that at date t=l, there exist the members
of generation 0, and -1. At the beginning of this period these agents hold the
aggregate capital stock of one unit (i.e. Xo.t + x.t•t = 1). In period 1 the members
of generation (-1) supply all their capital to maximize their period 1 consumption.
In this same period the members of generation 0 face budget constraint (3), and
constraint (4) in the following period. These agents then maximize their utility
function subject to these constraints.
Now, the tax rates that appear in the budget constraints are yet to be
determined. The mechanism that sets these parameters is now described. It is
assumed that at the beginning of every period t, the members of generation t-2, t-l,
and t vote on the size of the tax rates ('T"" 1'(,), which are restricted to be non-
negative. After the tax rates are then determined, the agents maximize utility
subject to their budget constraints while acting as price takers, and taking as given
the behavior ofother agents, including the behavior of future generations.
Itshould be apparent that the members of the old generation will prefer the
labor income tax since their sole source of income derives from capital. It should
also be apparent now that in any period the members ofthe young generation will
always prefer a capital income tax to a labor income tax, since their sole source of
income is labor income. Hence, the decision as to what the tax rates will actually
be is assumed to be determined solely by the members of middle-aged generation.
More will be said about this in the Appendix. It should also be noted that it is
assumed that agents are unable to commit to future voting strategies. Voting
outcomes are determined sequentially and are not tied to past voting behavior,
except through the state variable (X2.I)'
Obviously the middle-aged agents must balance costs of both types of
taxation. In particular, they dislike capital income taxation because they hold some
7capital. But they also dislike labor taxation for two reasons. First, a labor tax is also
a tax on their second period labor income, and so hurts them directly. Secondly,
this latter tax lowers the labor income of the young and middle-aged agents, and
thereby lowers the equilibrium price of capital, and hence lowers the return to
holding capital.
Along with these latterconsequences are other indirect effects ofthetaxation
methods. As will be made obvious below, both these taxes have the impact of
lowering the price ofcapital from what itwould otherwise be if there were no taxes.
This may be a fortunate effect from the point ofview of a middle-aged agent since
this may allow them to purchase more capital atthe reduced price and thereby raise
their consumption in the last period oftheir life. Yet another effect is that a change
in the tax rates, while an agent is middle aged, will influence the amount ofcapital
taken by his generation into the last period of life. This has the potentially
unfavorable affect of lowering the rate of return to capital, since these agents will
be subsequently supplying their capital inelastically, which helps lower the price and
rate ofreturn. Lastly, the agent must also consider how changes in the tax rates will
alter the future distribution of assets and thereby influence the voting behavior
future generations.
There is still one additional factor that the middle-aged agents must also take
into consideration. In each period t the govermnent must finance a level of
expenditures gr' and the govermnent revenue from capital and labor sources must
be sufficient to finance this expenditure level. The middle-aged agents must also
take this into consideration when formulating their voting strategy. This means that
the consideration of a marginally lower capital tax rate must then necessanly imply
a marginally higher labor tax. Agents are assumed to take all of these effects into
consideration when formulating their optimal voting strategy.
To illuminate this discussion, it may help to proceed with the solution ofthe
agents' optimization problem. In particular note first that in period t the agents who
are members of generation t have a trivial sort of behavior, described by equation
(2), in that they buy as much capital as their after-tax labor income will permit.
8Members ofgeneration t-2 consume all their after tax capital earnings, and so their
decision bears no more discussion. The interesting problem is then posed by
analyzing the decision problem of a member of generation t-1. Now consider this
optimization problem from the point ofview of such an agent after the tax rates in
period t have been set. Then such an agent maximizes the following objective
function
subject to the constraints
k t
c2" = (P, + d,)(l-1', )x2" + W 2,'(1-1',) - P,x3"






Now by substituting equations (2) and (9) into (5), the equilibrium price of capital
can then be derived as follows
P = ,
t [ k w1,,(1 - 1',) + d,(l-1', )x2., + w2,,(l
(11)
There are several important features ofthis pricing equation to note. First, observe
that the distribution of capital across the population influences the price of capital.
The more capital that is held by the middle-aged generation (x2,t), as opposed to
agents who are in the last period of their life, the higher the price of capital. This
9should make sense since the agents who are in the third period of life will be
supplying all their capital inelastically, and the more capital they have, the lower will
betheequilibrium price ofcapital. Consequently, themore capital held bymembers
of the middle-aged generation, the higher will be the price of capital. Secondly,
note that the higher the labor income tax the lower will be the price ofcapital since
the members ofgeneration t cannot afford to purchase as much capital. Lastly, the
higher is the capital income tax the lower is the price of capital as well. It is also
the case that the impact that changes in T/ or Tt
k have on Pt will depend on the
values of WI." w2,t, d" and x2,"
The government is restricted to balancing its budget each period so that it
must implement labor and capital tax rates each period to finance its expenditures.
~.Hence its budget constraint is written as follows
, k d g, ~ T, (WI,' + W2,,) + T, (P, + ,). (12)
Now a substitution of the optimal decision rules, (4) and (10), for a member of
generation t-1 back into their utility function (6) produces the following version of
an indirect utility function
This is the indirect utility function that the agents, who are middle-aged in
period t, seek to maximize. However, these agents also realize that their choice of
taxes will influence the price of capital in the present period (Pt), the future price
of capital (Pt+I), as well as their future asset holdings (x3,1+l)' Since X3t+1 is
determined from equations (5) and (9), and Pt and PH! are determined by versions
of equation (11), by making these substitutions into equation (13), and then after
conducting a mammoth amount of algebra, this indirect utility function can then be
rewritten as follows.
10This is the indirect utility function faced by an agent, who is a member ofgeneration
t-l, atthebeginning ofperiod t, and it reflects the optimal savings behavior for such
an agent, given any specified level for the tax parameters (~" Tt,), as well as other
variables including the tax rates in the last period of the agent's life (~t+b Tt'+l)'
The variables (W'.t+" W2,t+I' dt+l) appear because they influence the price ofcapital
in period t+1, and thereby influence the welfare of an agent who is a member of
generation t-l.
Two types of equilibria will be considered. The first is one in which the
middle-aged agent at date t takes the values of (~'+l' Ttt+l) as given when making
their decisions. For lack of a better name, this might be referred to as myopic
voting. In this instance the future taxes (~t+b Tt,+!) can influence the decisions and
welfare of agents at date t, and the levels of these taxes are taken into account.
However these agents ignore how their current policy decisions influence future tax
rates, since these are taken to be fixed parameters.
Perhaps a more satisfactory approach is to permit agents to take this feature
into account, although it significantly complicates the solution of the model. This
is the primary equilibrium under study and will be referred to as optimal voting. In
this instance it is apparent that the taxes chosen in period t, (~t, T
t
,), will influence
the wealth distribution in the subsequent period, (X2,'+I)' and thereby influence the
choices of (~'+1' Tt'+l) that are made in the subsequent period. The middle-aged
agents at date t then assume there is a dual mapping ~'+1 = gk(x"t+l), and Tft+l =
~(x2,'+1)' These agents must then essentially use this mapping to substitute these
functions for ~t+l and Ttt+l in equation (14). Additionally, they must then take into
11
(14)account how the choices of ~t, and T'I influence the value of Xz,1+r All of this is a
long-winded way ofstating that the objective function given by equation (14) is even
more complicated than itmight already appear in the instance in which agents take
all these features into account.
This is the point at which it is perhaps the easiest to see the difference
between the present analysis, and that of some other papers in this area. In the
present model, agents must make decisions each period regarding how their voting
decision will influence the future distribution of capital, and consequently how this
distribution will influence the future voting decisions ofother agents in the economy.
Voting occurs each period, notjust in the initial period, and the median voter is not
the same agent each period.
To accurately describe the nature of the equilibrium under study, it will be
useful to define a future at date t to be the following: .9; == {WI," wz", d" g,,}:=1'
Since the strategies ofagents at date t can be influenced by strategies employed by
future generations, is seems only natural that the proper state-space representation
for the strategies of agents at date t must then be include .9; since this shows how
the strategies must be a function ofexogenous variables realized in the present and
future. Additionally, as explained above, the level of Xz,t is also a state variable at
date t. Itwould then be perhaps more accurate to write the value function that is
to be maximized, given by equation (14), as V(~1+I' 7"1+1 ; xz,,, .9;). Then the
resulting maximized value of this function could be written as V*(~,,, .9;), since it is
then dependent on these two arguments.
Therefore, the strategies described below will consist of functions 'IT,(e) and
'lTk(e) such that 'IT;:[0,1] X IR~= --+[0,1] fori = k, e. These functions, which represent
the voting strategies ofan agent at date t, can then be written as ~t+l = 'lTk(Xz,,, .9;)
and 7"1+1 = 'IT,(Xz,,, .9;).4 Embedded in this description is a notion ofsymmetrysince
all agents are assumed to employ the same decision strategies.s Details of the
computation and characterization of the equilibria are presented in the Appendix.
In any case, it is assumed that at the beginning of each period the agents, in
12choosing the tax rates, are playing a Nash game against futnre generations. In the
case of the myopic voting, the middle-aged agents take futnre tax rates as given
when choosing their optimal tax rates. However, they take into account how these
tax rates will influence the present and future prices of capital, and asset
holdings.
6
,7 However, the main equilibrium under study is the optimal voting
scheme where middle-aged agents know that their decisions will influence thefuture
distribution ofwealth and therefore the subsequent voting behavior.
Finally, to make this discussion precise, it is worthwhile to proceed with the
following formal definition of the equilibrium under stndy when agents vote
optimally.
Definition: A Symmetric Nash Competitive Equilibrium for this perfect foresight
economy is a collection ofnon-negative sequences {d" g" p.. WI." w2,.. XI." x2," cl,.. ~..
~" Tt, } ~=I' such that for t2:1, the following conditions are satisfied.
i) Formembers ofgeneration t-1, given the realizations of(9';, ~t)' and
the functions which determine the voting behavior of futnre generations,
~t+1 = 1Tk(~t+I' 9';+1) and Tt'+I = 1Tt(X2,t+I' 9';+1)' the period t taxes (~" T
t
t) are
chosen to maximize the value function V,(~t,Ttt), as given by equation (14), subject
to the govermnent's budget constraint (12). Furthermore, the following consistency
conditions are satisfied: ~, = 1Tk (Xz.,' 9';), T
t
, = 1Tt(Xz.,' 9';).
ii) Given tax rates (~" Tt,), and the price of capital P"~ the quantities
(XI,.. ~.. cl,.. cz.t) maximize the utility function (6), subject to the budget constraints.
This implies the decision rules (2), (4), (9), and (10) are satisfied.
iii) The government budget constraint (12) holds for each period.
iv) Equation (5) holds, so that there is equilibrium in the capital market.
This implies that the price of capital (Pt) is given by equation (11).
It should also be noted that an exogenous constraint that is being imposed
is that the tax rates (~" Tt,) are restricted to being non-negative. This is an ad-hoc
restriction, but one that permits the behavior of the model to be somewhat more
13interesting.
The case ofmyopic voting can be defined in a similar manner to that above.
In this instance the middle-aged agent at date t takes the tax rates, '1"'1+1 and 'T
t
t+l'
as given when making his decisions.
Now equation (14) is a formidable and intimidating expression. Rather than
attempting to gain insights directly from this equation, it will be more enlightening
to look at a series ofexamples to obtain a feel for the nature of the equilibria ofthe
economy.
SOME SAMPLE ECONOMIES
Much ofthe work in the optimal taxation literature has the implication that
the "optimal" level of distortional taxation is that which minimizes the social
deadweight loss. This usually gives rise to optimal tax rates in which all
commodities are taxed to some degree so that the marginal social costs from all
forms of taxation are equated. This would be the case if one followed the Ramsey
tax rules. This might be referred to as a tax-smoothing argument.s It is then of
interest to see if, in the context ofthe above-specified framework with agents voting
on the optimal levels of taxation, the resulting tax levels would display such
properties, in the sense that agents will choose to have positive taxation on both
labor and capital.
As it happens, and as will be shown, for many of the examples that will be
presented below, this result does not obtain. In particular, middle-aged agents
always prefer to have capital taxation or labor taxation, but not both. Another way
ofputting this is to say that the value function displayed in equation (14), does not
appear to be concave in the tax rates ('I"'" 'Ttl)' which would help to produce an
interior optimum for these variables. The reason for this will be explained in the
first example. This is an illuminating result in that it shows a potential avenue
through which there might be a divergence between the actual observed taxation
rates, and those derived from the solution from some optimal planning problem.
14Example #1: This example illustrates the potential fluctuations that exist in the
model. In particular, there exists two equilibria which depend upon the initial
conditions ofthe economy. One displays limit cycles oftwo periods in length, while
the other does not.
The parameter values are chosen as follows: w1 .•=8, w2,t=g.=7, d,=5, and
{3=1, V t. Two different initial conditions are chosen for capital holdings of the
initial middle-aged agents.
9 One is x2,I=.430, while the other is x2,I=.431. There is
no other exogenous uncertainty in the economy. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting
paths for the price ofcapital in each case. The solid line shows the behavior for the
price of capital when X2,1=.431 while the dashed line is the price of capital when
X2,1=.430. Obviously, the solid line converges relatively quickly to a constant steady
state while the dashed line displays cycles. Figure 2 shows the resulting paths for
the capital holdings by the middle-aged agents for the same example. Again the
cycles appear in this variable as well, for the case where x2,1=.430.
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the tax rates that are observed in the
cyclic equilibrium. The dashed line is the path for the capital income tax, while the
solid line is the path for the labor income tax. In this non-cyclic equilibrium the
agents choose to use only the capital tax.
What is happening in this example is that when ~1=.430, the initial middle-
aged agents begin with relatively little capital, and consequently vote to tax capital
heavily in the first period of the economy, while choosing to not tax labor at all.
Consequently, they have comparatively little capital in period 2 because they began
with little in the previous period, and also because the young agents in the previous
period did not have their labor income taxed, and could then afford to purchase
plenty of capital. In period 2, the new middle-aged agents then have plenty of
capital, relative to the initial middle-aged in the previous period, and they do the
reverse: they vote to tax only labor and not capital at all. This pattern of behavior
then repeats itselfevery two periods. There is no convergence ofany ofthe decision
variables, nor for the price ofcapital, or the distribution of capital.
For the case where X2,l=.431, the initial middle-aged agents again initially
15choose to tax capital in the first period. However, because they initially hold a
sufficiently large amount of capital, relative to the case where xz.1=.430, the
subsequent middle-aged generation in period 2holds less capital, and therefore they
choose to tax capital in period 2. In comparison, when xz.1=.431, the middle-aged
generation in period 2 chooses to tax capital instead of labor since they hold less
capital than their second period counterpart would hold when xz.1=.430.
Consequently when xz.1=.431, the labor tax is never chosen, and capital tax is the
only method chosen to finance govermnent consumption.
As noted above, it is also of interest to see if the agents in this economy
voluntarily choose to implement some variant ofwhat may be called a tax-smoothing
policy. As Figure 3 shows, in the cyclic equilibrium, the solutions observed for the
.taxratestend to beofthe "bang-bang" variety, with themiddle-aged agents choosing
either labor or capital income tax, but not both.
Itshould be noted that there appears to a good reason why the middle-aged
agents dislike imposing both capital and labor taxation simultaneously. There exists
a form ofdouble taxation in this instance because labor taxation lowers the price of
capital, and lowers the return to capital, while the capital taxation also has a similar
impact, and lowers the after tax return to capital. Imposing both taxes
simultaneously appears to compound the effects. Agents in this environment want
to minimize their tax burden by essentially forcing other agents to bear the cost of
paying taxes. This implies making either the youngest or oldest agents bear the
brunt ofpaying taxes.
Figure 4 illustrates the transition dynamics for middle-aged capital holdings
in this example. The horizontal axis measures the quantity of capital held by the
middle-aged in period t (Xz.t)' while the horizontal axis measures the same variable
in the following period (Xz.t+1)' The upward-sloping line in the figure is a 45 degree
line which helps pinpoint the stationary equilibria. The downward-sloping line with
a break describes the transitional dynamics of asset holdings. As can be seen in the
diagram, there are many equilibria, depending on what the level ofthe initial asset
holdings. However, there appear to be only two limiting equilibria. One has a
16constant steady-state for capital holdings equal to .5346. The second equilibria is
the one which displays cycles, with X2,1 alternating between .4016 and .5763.
In any period, for any capital holdings (X2,I) less than .567 the middle-aged
agents will choose to use only capital taxation to finance government spending.
Alternatively, for a capital holdings greater than .567 the middle-aged agents will
choose only labor taxation. That is, the upper branch ofthis line (to the left of this
diagram) reflects the amount ofcapital held by middle-aged agents next periodwhen
the capital tax is imposed, while the lower branch describes the amount of capital
held when the labor tax is enacted. For capital holdings just equal to .567, the
middle-aged agent will be indifferent between the two 1ypes of taxation.
10
There is an interesting dynamic behavior in this example, under the
assumption that the endowments, dividends, and government spending are constant.
Ifthe initial middle-aged agents hold a capital stock less than .430, or greater than
.567, then the economy ultimately converges to the cyclical equilibrium. On the
other hand, ifthe initial middle-aged agents have capital holdings between .430 and
.567, then the economy ultimately converges to the non-cyclic equilibrium.
However, both the cyclic and non-cyclic equilIbria are locally stable.
Despite thefactthatthere is an equilibrium in which all endogenous variables
display cycles, this equilibrium is indeed stationary, since the variables do not
depend on time, once the capital holdings at the beginning ofthe period are known.
Also, in contrast with other models which produce cycles, the present framework
does not employ a backward-bending supply curve for saving, as a function of the
interest rate, and neither does it make use of any externality, except to the extent
that the voting scheme can be interpreted as one.
Itis also ofinterest tocompare the tax rates that arise in these equilibria with
those that would result from the solution to some sort of social planning problem.
Consider this same economy in which all endowments and dividends are constant
in all time periods. It is straightforward to set up a social planning problem which
maximizes the welfare ofa typical "representative agent" who could be a member of
any generation, and who maximizes utility subject to the budget and resource
17constraints described above. The planning problem is then to chose these tax rates
so as to maximize the utility of a representative agent. Obviously, this assumes
treating all agents in all generations identically.ll In this case, for this example it
turns out that the solution is to set the capital income tax rate to zero in each
period. The reason for this is relatively straightfolWard. Agents prefera higher rate
of return to saving since this enables them to obtain a higher level of utility from
consumption in the final period, and this is accomplished by having a low level of
capital taxation.
It is not obvious that this result obtains for all such economies. It is clear
from equation (11) that labor taxation also influences the rate of return to holding
capital, and it may be the case that in some instances the solution to this social
planning problem may entail some capital taxation. Even if this were the case, it
should not be too surprising. Capital is not an accumulative factor here, so taxing
capital does not influence the growth rate of output or consumption.
It is also of interest to compare the equilibria that can potentially arise for
this economywith those that arise with myopic voting, which is the case in which the
middle-aged agent at date t takes the tax rates (~I+\> Tt'+1) of date t+1 as given.
That is, the agent takes into account how his tax choices (~" Tt,) at date t influence
the distribution of wealth (X2,1+1)' but ignores the how this influences the tax rates
(~'+l> Tt1+1) in that period. This assumption greatly simplifies the computation of
the equilibria since there is a complicated strategic avenue that can be streamlined.
It turns out that for this example the equilibria that arise are identical to those in
which this assumption is not made, and agents consider the full impact of their tax
decisions on subsequent variables. That is, the equilibria are identical.
The reason why these might be identical is that in the myopic voting




if x2,r < .567
otherwise
(15)
Consequently, when evaluated at either x2,t = .4016, or ~t = .5763, the derivative
of this function is zero. If one were then to take the derivative of equation (14)
with respect to the tax rates, this derivative would involve terms such as
(ar:+l/dx2,t+l)(dx2,t+l/ar:). These terms would be zero along the equilibrium path.
A similar argument could be made for the capital tax rate, but in this instance the
tax rate is "almost piecewise flat."12 Therefore the strategic interaction that would
be present in which the agent would consider how the choice ofhis tax rate would
fully influence the determination of future taxes, appears to amount to a second
order effect at best.
A word ofcaution should be issued however, as it is not always the case that
these equilibria are identical. As will be shown in the subsequent example, as the
level of government spending rises, the more likely it will be that the transition
relation ofFigure 4 will not cross the 45 degree line. In the case ofoptimal voting
there does not appear to be an easily characterizable equilibrium. In the case of
myopic voting, this means there is no non-cyclic equilibrium.
Additionally, it is of interest to compare the equilibria for this economy to
those that arise if the middle-aged agents at date t=1 do the voting for all future
time periods. That is, in the first period these agents choose a set oftax rates they
wish to see imposed for all ftlture time periods. This is of interest since this is
sometimes a simplifying assumption made in the literature which permits the
characterization of models that might otherwise be unmanageable (Alesina and
Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993), and Cooley and Soares (1994».
Figure 5 is an attempt to make this comparison, although it should be
interpreted with caution. The horizontal axis is the capital holdings ofmiddle-aged
agents in the first period (X2,l) and the vertical axis is the capital holdings ofmiddle-
aged agents in period 2 (X2,2). The solid line is merely an extension ofthe transition
19diagram ofFigure 4, and therefore represents the transition ofcapital holdings when
agents vote optimally each period. The dashed line is the transition diagram when
there is voting only in the initial period. For x2" > .567, or x2,' S .178, the dashed
and solid lines are identical. When optimal voting takes place each period, ifX2,1 >
.567, the labor tax is chosen, and otherwise capital taxation is imposed. For the case
in which voting takes place only in the initial period the transition relation is
continuous, and the labor tax is chosen by the initial period for all future periods if
X2,1 > .191. For .178 < X2,l < .191, the policies that are chosen consist of positive
capital and labor taxes. Hence this indicates the differences thatarelikely to appear
in models where agents can only vote in an initial period, as opposed to voting in
every period. This appears to point to how distinctive these equilibria can be since
the equilibrium tax rates can be quite different.
Example #2: The point of this example is to illustrate the manner in which the
equilibrium of the model may change in reaction to a fully anticipated exogenous
shock to the labor endowment of young agents. Again there exists two equilibria
for this economy, and if the exogenous shock is sufficiently large the economy will
move from the non-cyclic equilibrium to the cyclical one.
The parameter values arechosen as follows: wl,lo=10.4, and otherwise w1 .,=8,
w2,,=7, d,=g,=5, f3=1 V t, and x2,I=.4. That is, the economy has no exogenous
disturbances until period 10 when the young agents receive a temporarily high
endowment shock.
Figure 6 shows the resulting behavior for the capital holdings ofthe middle-
aged agents. Starting from x2,I=.535, the capital holdings have converged to a
constant, and capital is always taxed while labor is not. However, the exogenous
disturbance is sufficiently large that from period 10 onward, the economy is in a
cyclical equilibrium with every second generation holding relatively large quantities
of capital. The resulting behavior for the price of capital is shown in Figure 7.
Again, this price is converging to a constant until period 10, when it then exhibits
cycles as well.
20The path for the equilibrium tax rates displays a similar behavior. Until
period 10, the agents choose to only use the capital tax, with the labor tax always
being zero. After period 10, the agents choose to alternate these taxes, choosing the
labor tax only in even periods and the capital tax in odd periods.
It should be noted that the exogenous shock in this example has been "large
enough" to cause the economy to take a path onto the cyclical equilibrium. For
smaller disturbances the economy might only gravitate back to the non-cyclic
equilibrium after several periods. Additionally, changing the levels for some of the
parameters orvariables may alter this behavior. For example, for the same identical
economy but with a slightly different discount factor, this same exogenous
disturbance may result in merely a return to the non-cyclic equilibrium. This type
of disturbance is "more likely" to result in a move to the cyclic equilibrium, the
closer is the "break" in the transition relation (see Figure 4) to the 45 degree line.
It is also possible that an economy that is currently following the cyclic equilibrium
may move to the non-cyclic equilibrium in reaction to an exogenous disturbance.
This is a good point to note that it is indeed the endogenous voting
mechanism that is generating the cycles in this economy. Itis easy to show thatwith
constanttax rates, an endowment shock ofthe type described above would generate
relatively mild fluctuation in asset holdings and the price ofcapital for a few periods,
but the economy would then return to the non-cyclic steady-state.
It should also be noted that examples can also be constructed in which a
temporarily unusually high or low level of government consumption is also capable
of generating these types of cycles.
Example #3: This example is presented to illustrate how the transition dynamics
for capital holdings is affected by the level of government spending. Consider two
alternative economies, one which is identical to that in the first example with
wi,,=8, w2,,=g,=7, d,=5, Vt and 13=1. The second is identical except that g, = 5.
Clearly, in this new case the tax rates must be lower to finance the lower level of
government consumption. The lines in Figure 8 describing transitional dynamics
21display a smaller "break" in this case in which g, = 5 since the taxes, when imposed,
have a much smaller impact on the future capital holdings since the taxes are lower.
If government consumption were zero, then there would be no break in the
transitional dynamics line at all since all taxes would be zero. This illustrates why
there are no such cycles when g, = O. What this seems to imply is that, roughly
speaking, the lower is the level of government spending, the more likely it will be
that the economy will attain the non-cyclic equilibrium.
It should also be noted that to produce a cyclic equilibrium, it is necessary
that the "break" in the transition relation be "near" the 45 degree line. Ifit takes
place far enough away form this line, there will be no cyclic equilibrium.
An exogenous constraint imposed on this problem is to only permit the tax
rates to be non-negative. Permitting some negative taxation has an effect similar to
that of increasing the level of government consumption, and thereby potentially
increase the likelihood that there will be a cyclical equilibrium. Permitting negative
taxes only increases the ability ofmiddle-aged agents to extract resources from other
generations and this is what can lead to the existence of the cyclical equilibrium.
Example #4: This example illustrates how the model behaves for different discount
factors. This example is identical to the example #1 with the exception that the
discount factor is lower. For both economies the parameters are w,.•=8, wz .,=g,=7,
d,=5, '<:/ 1. For one economy f3 = 1.0, while for the other f3 = .80.
To obtain an understanding of how changing the discount factor influences
the equilibrium itmay be useful to look atFigure 9, where the transitional dynamics
for asset holdings is illustrated for different discount factors. Increasing (decreasing)
the discount factor tends to move this function toward (away from) the origin. The
reason appears to be that increasing f3 results in increased saving and therefore a
higher price of capital. This in turn means that young agents cannot afford to
purchase as much capital, and so this results in a lower level of ~•.
It should be stated that not all configurations of this economy exhibit the
cycles displayed in these examples. To produce these cycles requires the right kind
22of balance between the ratio of capital to labor income on the one hand, and the
discount factor on the other hand. In particular, for a given discount factor ({3), if
the agent's labor income is too high, relative to the amount of capital income, then
agents may always prefer to have labor taxed. Conve~sely, holding the discount
factor constant, if there is very little aggregate labor income, then agents may then
always prefer capital taxation. Alternatively, holding constant the levels of
endowments and dividends, the agent is more likely toprefer the capital (labor) tax,
the lower (higher) is the discount factor since this makes future consumption less
(more) important. It should be noted, however, that experimentation has revealed
that although not all economies exhibit these fluctuations, neither are the economies
that do exhibit this behavior "knife-edge," or extremely special cases. A wide range
.of economies can be seen to display these features.
It would also possible to incorporate an endogenous labor decision in the
agents second period of life. However, in some cases this effect only serves to
exacerbate the effects described aboveY This is because a fall in the agent's wage
will then encourage them towork less, which will then lower their wage income even
further.
Example #5: This example is presented to show how the transition dynamics for
capital holdings is affected by the composition of aggregate output into its
components oflabor and capital income. Consider two alternative economies, one
which is identical to that in the first example with w1,,=8, w2,,=g,=7, d,=5, Vt, and
{3=1. The second is identical except that wi,,=12. Figure 10 shows how the
transitional dynamics for capital holdings behaves in the two cases. Loosely
speaking, increasing the agent's labor income has the effect of making capital
income relatively less scarce than it would otherwise be. Consequently, agents are
more likely to want to choose the labor tax, and more likely to choose the capital
tax. In Figure 10, the break in the line describing the transitional dynamics of asset
holdings is moved to the left when the amount of steady-state labor income
IDcreases. Because of this the non-cyclic equilibria exists in both ofthese cases, but
23when wl,t=12 this equilibrium has only labor income being taxed. In the equilibrium
in which wl,t=8, the equilibrium has only capital being taxed.
FURTHER REMARKS
Barro (1979) presents some normative reasons why, in a dynamic
environment, govermnents should "smooth" the tax rates so as to minimize the
burden of taxes.
14 The present positive analysis illustrates why atomistic agents,
behaving in a privately optimal manner, would choose to have a tax structure which
would appear tocause some fluctuations in endogenous variables. In particular, this
analysis points to where the potential divergences might arise among positive and
normative tax analyses. The public finance literature is replete with research
showing the ways in which observed tax rates may differ from the "optimal" tax
policies, for reasons that are usually left unexplained. Nevertheless, presumably an
arguable view is that society has arrived at its current tax policies by agents making
optimalchoiceswhen choosing political representatives who will makepolicychoices
for that will affect society. It is also our task to understand how and why these
choices are made.
In some sense, the results of this paper support those found in Krusell,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1994), and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1993a). These models
show the radical metamorphosis that an economy can undertake once policy
determination is made endogenous. Krusell and Rios-Rull show how a
redistribution ofsmall amount ofcapital from one group ofagents to the others can
result in a large change in the steady-state levels ofconsumption, output and capital.
In attempting to compare the behavior ofthe model with that in the data, it
must be noted that agents in the model are using the available policy tools to
maximize their welfare. Here the available policy tools are the tax rates on capital
and labor. More generally, one would think that there are many more policy tools
that agents could employ, such as a whole plethora of govermnent spending and
taxation schemes that could be utilized, which might obscure the fluctuations in the
tax rates alone.
24As with any analysis, the present paper leaves many questions unanswered.
Here assumptions were placed on how policy variables were determined, but
alternative mechanisms could also be employed. It was exogenously imposed that
government revenue is derived from the taxation oflabor or (gross) capital income.
It would be better if it could be shown that such a policy mechanism is "optimal"
relative to a set ofpotential mechanisms. This remains a formidable topicfor future
research.
The present model has a fixed capital stock. It would be enlightening to
know how this type of endogenous policy determination would influence the level
of endogenous investment and output. Presumably higher capital tax rates would
deter capital accumulation, and influence the wealth distribution in the future!S
.Huffman (1993) has already studied this issue within the context of a simple model
in which agents vote myopically, in the sense described above. Most of the results
shown above still obtain when capital accumulation is incorporated. In particular,
the agents still choose tax rates of the "bang-bang" variety. It is also possible to
show that if agents are permitted to vote on the size of the inflation tax in any
period in order to finance government spending, then they might choose a volatile
path for inflation, as this is just another tax.
Additionally, it is also of interest to know how the results presented above
would change if a different utility function were employed. Preliminary work in this
area indicates that the existing dynamics still are presentwith other utility functions,
but that other dynamics are also present. By changing the elasticity of substitution
ofconsumption between periods, it appears that the slope of the line describing the
transition dynamics of asset holdings (e.g. Figure 4) can be made steeper or flatter.
In particular, if this line is made sufficiently steep then the non-cyclic steady-state
equilibrium can be made unstable. However, this topic would appear to present
even more computational or analytical challenges, since the logarithmic utility
function appears to considerably simplify the analysis.
One change in the utility function which would likely radically change the
results would be to include bequests by making agents care about subsequent
25generations. This would destroy the desire of agents to choose policies and actions
that would hurt the subsequent generations. In fact, this would likely make the
economy much more similar to that of Krusell aud Rlos-Rull (1993a), who analyze
a representative agent economy.
It is possible that this approach could also be utilized to explain why
government spending would be increased at some times and not others. Rather
than justsaying that this government spending is wasteful, instead this activity might
be undertaken due to the fact that there would be a significantly large constituency
that benefits from such expenditures. Additionally, it may be possible to use a
similar model to explain the level of the deficit that the government may run.
Possibly the aforementioned features of the economy could cause government
spending to display an unstable response to a temporary disturbance to the
economy.
The forgoing analysis raises obvious questions concerning the manner in
which our economic policy-making institutions are designed. Dowe choose to have
institutions in which citizens can potentially exert unremitting or day-to-day control
of government policy based on their own private self interests? Or, on the other
hand, do we choose to have institutions which set out policy according to some
relatively fixed rules that cannot be easily changed based on the whimsy or vocal
protests of groups of citizens?16 Should we choose to have constitutional
amendments prohibiting certain types of taxation, as there effectively is now in the
U.S. with the poll tax, or at least put some restrictions on the amount of this
taxation? To gain an increased understanding of the factors that influence the
determination ofpolicy parameters, it would appear that one cannot avoid writing
down formal models and investigating how agent's preferences over various policies
can change the equilibrium.
26APPENDIX
First of all, from the discussion above it should be apparent that the
equilibrium choices tax rates can potentially depend on the future levels of the
exogenous variables, which can be written as 9'; == {w,." w2," <I., g,}:=I' However, it
will be convenient to suppress this dependence for notational convenience. It is
then necessary to find functions gk(0) and gt(0) that characterize the equilibrium
voting behavior such that ~I+I = gk(X2,I+I)' and 1't
l+1= gt(X2,1+1)' Of course, it is
easily shown from equations (2), (5), (9), (11), and (12) that the tax rates chosen in
period t (~" 1'tl ) influence the level resulting level ofx2,t+1' Let ~t+1 = H(~" 1'tl, x2,t)
denote this relationship, which can be written out in a closed-form but cumbersome
expression. Keep in mind that the function H(o) is known, but the functions gk(o)
and.gt(o) are to be determined. The value function of equation (14) can then be
re-written as follows:
Characterizing the tax rates then involves finding a pair of functions, gk(0)
and gt(o), which maximize the function given by equation (AI)." In particular, it
is necessary to find functions such that when agents expect future votes to be
determined by such a function, then they will also choose to behave in the same
manner. This ensures that agents are taking into account all the equilibrium effects
of various available policies on present and future prices, tax rates, and capital
allocations. In practice, a guess for these functions is obtained from solving the
simpler myopic voting problem. Then the method of successive approximations is
applied by calculating the optimal response ofan agent given thatfuture generations
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(AI)are expected to follow behavior described by the initial guess. The voting behavior
of this agent is then used an new guess for the functions gk(.) and g,(.). This
method is then repeatedly applied until a fixed-point is obtained.
After the decisions have derived, various other issues can be addressed. It
is easy to see that the old agents would always prefer the labor tax. Itseems entirely
plausible thatyoung agents in any periodwould always prefera capital taxsince they
own no capital. However, intuitive plausibility rarely constitutes a proof, and in this
case with so many complicated avenues for a voting agent to consider, this mayor
may not be the case. Fortunately, in these economies once the decision rules are
constructed, it is possible to check that indeed the young agents do prefer the labor
tax be set to zero.
The computationsfor this economywere conducted by partitioning the choice
space for x2,t into a grid of 1800 points, and restricting the agents asset choices to
lie in this space. Similarly, the choice space for the capital and labor tax rates is
similarly partitioned. Increasing the number of points in this grid beyond 1800 did
not change the results in any experiments that were conducted. Each iteration of
the procedure for computing the tax rates would take approximately 6 hours on a
Pentium machine. The main stumbling-block to obtaining quicker computations is
in inverting the functions gio) and &(.) to obtain the function H(o). Presumably
this process could be accelerated by utilizing some sort of approximation scheme,
but then this would bring into question the accuracy of such a method. For some
economies, the results were identical when there were only 200 points in the grid
and the computations were obviously much faster in this instance. Computing the
equihbrium for the myopic voting scheme is much quicker, and produces the same
results in some instances as the optimal voting scheme. Therefore, is was used as
an initial guess for the voting in the procedure described above.
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30FOOTNOTES
1. On the normative side, Lucas (1990) describes why the desired tax on capital should
bezero. In a positive and normative analysis, Barro (1979) shows why the government may
wish to "smooth" the levels of distortional taxation over time so as to minimize the
deadweight loss from the taxation.
2. Much ofthis existing literature contains analyses ofmodels which are finite horizon
economies. The model studied in the present paper has an infinite horizon, and as such
permits an analysis ofhow the endogenous variables evolve over time in reaction tovarious
disturbances. Alesina and Spear (1988) use the overlapping generations model to
construct a model ofelectoral competition. Boldrin (1993) uses a three-period overlapping
generations framework to analyze the impact that public school financing has on the
accumulation has on human capital. Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1994), and Krusell
and Rios-Rull (1993a, 1993b) also provide a very interesting analysis of the impact of
endogenous policy formulation within a dynamic infinite-horizon environment.
As noted by Alesina (1988), much of the extant literature is rather descriptive, and
not cast within the context of a general equilibrium optimizing framework. The present
paper, however, does fall into this category.
3. It could alternatively be assumed that only the dividend was taxable but this would
not alter the central qualitative nature of the results. Itwould, however, change some of
the quantitative results presented in the next section since it would lower the tax base for
the capital tax rate.
4. Of course, the optimal strategies may in fact be characterized by a correspondence
and, as will be shown below, in practice some states appear to have utility-maximizing
strategies that are not unique. In this discussion however, it is assumed that the voting
strategies are determined by a selection from this correspondence.
5. Also, the equilibrium has a Markov structure which is somewhat unusual in that one
statevariable is thevalue of.9;, which descnbes thefuture values ofendowments, dividends,
and government consumption.
316. Agents also take into account how the taxes imposed in the present period will
influence future asset holdings of the next generation, (since this is just one minus the
amount the current middle-aged generation will choose to hold) and hence how these asset
holdings will affect the future price ofcapital.
7. Itmay be that there would be other equilibria as well with more complex forms of
strategic interaction, but the present approach would seem to preserve a sufficient degree
of simplicity and tractability, given the complexity ofthe dynamics in this infinite horizon
economy.
8. That is, this is meant to be an intratemporal argument: tax rates in a given period
should be set so as to minimize this tax burden. However, as argued by Barro (1979),
obviously the same argument has been used to conclude that taxes should also be set
intertemporally to minimize this burden as well.
9. For this example, the capital-share oftotal income, equal to (1/4), is similar to that in
the data. Nevertheless, it is unclear as to what the appropriate level should be of some
parameters within this overlapping models.
10. In this instance, the agent will be indifferent between complete capital taxation or
labor taxation, and hence the optimal strategy is a correspondence.
11. However, the welfare ofthe initial old and middle-aged generations are ignored so
as to consider only the generations who enter the economy after period t=1. Taking the
initial generations into account would likely alter this conclusion.
12. The reason it is not quite piece-wise flat is that the price of capital is endogenous.
13. This would depend on the relative strengths of the wealth and substitution effects.
If the latter dominated the former then the economy is likely to display the features
described above since a labor tax would then reduce the work effort and further reduce
labor income.
14. The environment considered here has the government running a balanced budget
each period, whereas Barro is concerned with setting taxes optimally when the government
32can have positive levels of debt outstanding.
15. Hence, this majorityvoting scheme maybeanother propagation mechanism whereby
temporary technology disturbances would influence future levels of output, although it
seems unlikely that these could be used to explain the high-frequency business cycle
movements in aggregate time-series.
16. This has everything to do with how central banks are structured in different
economies. Some countries, such as the Germany choose to have relatively independent
central banks that are supposed to focus primarily on producing price stability. Other
countries choose to have central banks that are much less independent of the executive or
legislative branches of government, and are more susceptible to political pressure.
This is also related to how government institutions at different levels are designed.
For example, what policy forces should be vested in the Federal Government ofa country,
and which powers should be possessed by the local governments?
17. In fact it is necessary to find only one such function since the other is determined
jointly by equations (11) and (12).
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